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Abstract 
BRAC implemented the Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Specially 
Targeted Ultra-Poor (CFPR) program in 2002 to mitigate ultra-poverty in the 
poorest districts of Bangladesh, providing multifaceted support in the form of 
asset-transfer, food-stipends, education, healthcare and social support for two 
years. Utilizing a four-round panel data spanning 9 years and combining 
regression and propensity score weighting, we evaluate CFPR’s short and long 
term impact on  income, employment, social status, food security and asset 
ownership. While remarkable effects of CFPR are evident in short and 
medium-term (up to 6 years since baseline), longer-term effects (up to 9 years) 
are smaller. The latter happens due to a variety of factors including faster 
catch-up by the control group, due partly to various new interventions by state 
and non-state sectors. We see a shift from begging, working as maids and day-
laboring to entrepreneurial activities in the short and medium term, but many 
CFPR households revert back to their baseline employment by 2011. Analyses 
of the heterogeneity of effects across baseline employment and gender of the 
household-head reveal greater long-term impact on per-capita income for 
entrepreneurs and greater short-term impact for female-headed households. 
Overall, despite the deceleration of the effects in the long run, the program 
was able to successfully bring its participants out of ultra-poverty and had 
important demonstration effects. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite numerous development interventions implemented across the world, poverty remains 
endemic with more than a billion people living under the $1.25 poverty line. Over the past 
decade however, increasing attention had been directed towards the extreme poor, most 
recently epitomized by the World Bank president Jim Yong Kim declaring the goal to eradicate 
extreme poverty by 2030 (World Bank, 2013). Extreme poverty diverges from typical poverty in 
degrees of deprivation, duration and in magnitude (Smith, 2007; Chronic Poverty Research 
Centre, 2008). The absence of formal or informal safety nets makes it difficult for the extreme 
poor to access basic essentials like education, healthcare and finance, making them highly 
vulnerable to even the slightest shock that then results in a downward spiral of further 
deprivation. 
Despite having one of the poorest economies in the world, Bangladesh is acclaimed for its 
impressive progress in poverty reduction and achieving many of the Millennium Development 
Goals (Chowdhury, Bhuiya, et al., 2013). Although the number of people living in poverty and 
ultra-poverty decreased substantially between 2000 and 2010, the proportion of the ultra-poor 
remains considerable at 21 percent (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2010; Gimenez, Ahmed, et 
al., 2013). Given the distinctive characteristics of the extreme poor, they are often 
circumvented by the conventional development interventions and financial services. Programs 
need to be designed with specific targeting mechanisms to prevent the poorest from being 
excluded or from opting out voluntarily (Navajas, Schreiner, et al., 2000). Hailed as one of the 
biggest breakthroughs against poverty, the microfinance programs that serve over 25 million 
poor people in Bangladesh have been found to have positive impacts on both income and 
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vulnerability (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006; Yuge, 2011). A wide body of evidence confirms its 
efficacy for the moderate poor. In most cases however, the ultra-poor are unable to derive any 
benefits from it due to entry restrictions into such programs, while at the same time, many of 
the ultra-poor are reluctant to join such programs in the first place due to social and economic 
restrictions (Evans, Adams, et al., 1999; Hulme, Moore, and Shepherd, 2001; Matin and Hulme, 
2003). 
BRAC, one of the largest non-government organizations (NGOs) in the world, has been directing 
its resources to mitigate the multifaceted aspects of poverty in Bangladesh since inception in 
1972. BRAC recognized that most interventions precluded the participation of the ultra-poor 
which led to the inception of the program Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: 
Targeting the Ultra-Poor (CFPR) in 2002 with the explicit intention of reaching down to the 
ultra-poor and pushing them out of ultra-poverty and ready them to join some of the 
mainstream poverty alleviation programs such as microfinance. It is important to note that 
BRAC’s definition of ultra-poverty diverges from the $1.25/day definition of World Bank’s 
extreme poverty. The ultra-poor are defined by BRAC to be the lower subset of the extremely 
poor, earning less than $0.60-$0.70 per day (BRAC, 2013). The CFPR  required the participants 
to enroll for a period of two years during which time they were provided a productive asset 
base, continuous and intensive training sessions, both in-class and hands on, on maintaining 
such assets, a food subsidy, education, and social and legal support. They were also provided 
with nutritional supplements and had access to BRAC’s own panel doctors free of charge 
throughout the duration of participation. So far success of the CFPR program has been well 
recognized and replicated within and outside Bangladesh. More than eight organizations have 
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adopted and are currently implementing versions of the program in Bangladesh. BRAC is also 
providing technical assistance to organizations in Afghanistan, Canada, Ethiopia, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Pakistan, Peru and Yemen for program implementation. 
The program combines a number of targeting methods and poverty assessment tools to ensure 
high inclusion rates of the ultra-poor (Sulaiman and Matin, 2006).A number of studies have 
confirmed the positive effects of CFPR on participants’ health and health related expenditures 
(Ahmed, 2006; Prakash and Rana, 2006; Ahmed and Hossain, 2007) food security status 
(Haseen, 2006; Haseen and Sulaiman, 2007;Ahmed and Rana, 2010), and socioeconomic status 
measured through income and the type of employment (Mehnaz and Sulaiman, 2006). While 
most of the studies looked at short term impacts (2002-2005), some have investigated medium 
term effects (2002-2008). Raza, Das, and Misha (2012), Das and Misha (2010) and Krishna, 
Poghosyan, and Das (2012) found the program to have significant and consistent positive 
impacts on per capita income, income generating assets and food security during the six year 
period. As the main goal of CFPR was to give the ultra-poor a big push to break the cycle of 
poverty, it is important to establish the program’s impact in the longer run.  This paper is the 
first to demonstrate impact of CFPR seven years after completion of the program. We study 
effects on a large battery of outcomes; both directly incentivized by the program and more 
general indicators of socioeconomic status, and investigate heterogeneity of effects across 
baseline employment status and gender. This paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 describes 
the CFPR program and gives an overview of the literature evaluating its effectiveness, Section 3 
describes the data and the methods, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 provides a 
discussion and conclusion.  
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2. CFPR Background 
2.1 Description of the program 
The CFPR program was first launched in Rangpur; Kurigram and Nilphamari districts of northern 
Bangladesh as a pilot in 2002 that was scaled up subsequently to cover 15 more districts and 
100,000 participant households or nearly a half  million population over the next four years.i  
The northern districts of Bangladesh typically suffer from acute seasonal unemployment post-
cropping seasons, more commonly referred to as monga. As the program explicitly targeted the 
poorest of the poor, a thorough multi-step targeting procedure was utilized. Based on the 
poverty and vulnerability mapping by the World Food Program, the poorest districts and sub-
districts were initially identified. Subsequently, in consultation with field level BRAC staff who 
have an in-depth knowledge of the localities, specific villages were designated as targets. Prior 
to the identification process, BRAC field staffs spent a few days in each location building rapport 
and gathering information on every single household and their inhabitants. This allowed them 
to identify the invisible households who often fail to show up in survey or census data 
(Sulaiman and Matin, 2008). Special attention was paid to female headed households as they 
generally are the most vulnerable and are most likely to be overlooked (Sulaiman and Matin, 
2006).ii During the next stage of the targeting process, a community wealth ranking exercise 
known as Participatory Rural Appraisal was carried out (Chambers, 1994). According to these 
wealth rankings, a little more than 25% of the households were initially identified as ultra-poor. 
The community defined ultra-poor were then re-checked against the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria.iii A final round of verification was carried out by senior level BRAC field staff to generate 
7 
 
the final list of households eligible for CFPR support. This final verification was conducted using 
a structured questionnaire to collect information on, among others, demographic 
characteristics, land ownership and cultivation, housing, income, assets, NGO involvement and 
loans, and benefits from government or other sources. 
The program operated on a two year cycle during which time the participants received a 
multitude of services. The initial 18 months included the transference of a choice of income 
generating assets (IGAs) such as livestock, poultry, vegetable gardening and nursery, small 
grocery shop, inputs (such as vaccinations and housing for the animals) and intensive training to 
maintain the IGAs, business development training, subsistence allowance so that the 
participants can devote time to look after the assets, access to health care, and awareness 
training. The last 6 months involved weaning the participants from the program support 
through extensive confidence building workshops and mobilizing local social support.  
Post selection into the program, the first step was identification of the most appropriate IGA for 
a participant taking into account prior experience, capability of enterprise management as well 
as local market, environment, and social factors. The most popular IGAs were livestock and 
poultry rearing. Participants received training customized according to the enterprise they 
chose with an average value of the assets transferred of Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) 6,000.ivUpon  
receipt of the IGAs, the participants began receiving  additional inputs required to maintain the 
assets such as vaccinations, housing for the animals, weekly follow-up by BRAC staff for 
technical advice and supervision, and receive a weekly subsistence allowance of BDT 70 to 
make up for any earnings foregone as an opportunity cost of taking care of the assets. 
Additionally, the participants were required to save BDT 10 each week.  
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The health support package included BRAC-supported health volunteers, Shasthya Shebikas, in 
the villages, CFPR program staff, and a panel doctor at the local BRAC health program. The 
Shebikas were selected from each locality and trained as front-line providers of preventive and 
curative services for common illnesses (Standing and Chowdhury, 2008). In cases of a severe 
illness, members in the participant households received services from the panel doctor free of 
charge. Free antenatal and postnatal care including various supplements were also provided to 
expectant mothers. 
The social development (SD) component of the program was designed to create knowledge and 
awareness among the participants about their rights. In addition to providing regular awareness 
on topics such as dowry and child marriage, the SD component also mobilized local elite 
support for the participants to counteract possible crowding out of informal insurance because 
of program participation. A forum of the local elites called Gram Daridro Bimochon Committee 
(GDBC or Village Poverty Alleviation Committee) formed in every intervention village helped in 
this regard.  
Soon after the two year period, soft and flexible microfinance loans were availed to the 
interested participants to further incentivize investment in income generating activities, and 
discourage detrimental sources of finances such as high interest money lenders (Huda, Kaur, et 
al., 2011). 
The expenditures per participating household for the two year duration were approximately 
BDT 20,000 (or US$ 292). This figure includes the costs related to the income generating assets 
provided, administration and also for all the support provided over the entire duration of the 
program.  
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2.2 A review of the short and medium term effects of CFPR 
A number of studies have evaluated the impacts of CFPR on the short and medium term on 
various outcomes. Most of this literature relies on a comparison (over time) between those 
households selected into CFPR and those identified as poor by the PRA but not selected into the 
program. We come back to the comparability between both groups in the methods section. 
A qualitative study by Ahmed and Hossain (2007) found that the free health care services 
provided by the panel doctors were quite helpful in the sense of the service being available and 
easily accessible. Positive effects (8% increase) were found on  women’s self-reported health 
status in the short run (2002-2004) (Ahmed, 2006; Prakash and Rana, 2006) and  substantial 
improvement was found in both self-reported and measured food-security status with the 
average calorie intake going up from 1750 to 2138 per day during 2002-2005 (Haseen, 2006; 
Ahmed and Rana, 2010). Also mean intakes of protein, fat, carbohydrate, calcium, iron, vitamin 
C, and retinol were higher among participants compared to the control group two years after the 
program ended (Haseen and Sulaiman, 2007).  
In the short term (2002-2005), participation had significant positive effects on income and food 
security, household durables, and livestock, but no discernible impact on ownership of cultivable 
land, physical value of the household and other productive assets (Rabbani, Prakash, and 
Sulaiman, 2006; Walker and Matin, 2006;HaseenandSulaiman, 2007; Emran, Robano and Smith, 
2014). Raza, Das, and Misha (2012) found increasing medium-term (2002-2008) returns to 
program participation on  per capita income (BDT 1833), and in contrast to short term findings- 
they reported increase on landholdings. Household durable goods, income generating assets and 
10 
 
food security also experienced positive changes during this period. Krishna, Poghosyan, and Das 
(2012) additionally report an increased probability of having savings from less than eight percent 
in 2002 to 94 percent in 2005 and 98 percent in 2008.  
It was found that after two years of program support and provision of some flexibilities in 
borrowing from BRAC microfinance, in the short and medium run (2002-2008), more than two 
thirds of CFPR graduates  could participate in the formal credit markets (Shams, Mahmud, and 
Das, 2010). Overall, participation in the CFPR program benefitted the participants significantly 
over the short term and up to 5 years after graduation.  
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3. Methods 
3.1 Data 
This paper utilizes a four round panel data set collected in three northern districts (Nilphamari, 
Kurigram and Rangpur) of Bangladesh, generally characterized as among the poorest in the 
country (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2010). The baseline survey canvassed 5626 
households during the first quarter of 2002. The second survey took place around the same 
time in 2005 consisting of 5228 households. The third round was undertaken in 2008 
comprising of 4549 households following which, the final survey of 4144 households was 
implemented in 2011. No new households were added on in between the waves and no 
households that drop out re-appear in any of the following waves. Tests for attrition bias are 
discussed in section 3.3. Respondents were typically the main female member of the 
household. The surveys were held with the entire group of households identified as the poorest 
within the village through the PRA exercises, so the sample includes both those households that 
were selected into the program and those that were identified as poor but were not selected 
for program participation. 
For the purpose of this paper, the main outcomes of interest were divided into two groups: 
primary outcomes that were immediately affected by program participation (number of 
livestock, poultry and big trees and financial market participation) and secondary ones, affected 
over time, that relate to households’ social and economic status (per capita income, having any 
cash savings, occupation, ownership of homestead or cultivable land, ownership of other 
income generating assets such as rickshaws and luxury items such as radios or TVs, 
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characteristics of the household dwelling (roof), food security status and social capital). Directly 
influenced outcomes are defined net of program transfer. While previous papers on the 
program’s impact in  short and medium terms have not distinguished between directly or 
indirectly affected outcomes, the outcome indicators measured have largely remained 
consistent (Das and Misha, 2010; Krishna, Poghosyan, and Das, 2012; Raza, Das, and Misha, 
2012). 
Landholdings not only aid the livelihood, but also convey additional status and prestige in a 
predominantly agrarian country such as Bangladesh (Krishna, Poghosyan, and Das, 2012). 
However, due to high inflow of funds from sources such as remittances, land prices face 
constant inflationary pressure and in general were seen to be beyond the reach of the 
participants prior to the program.v Considering the little variation in the amount of landholdings 
in our samplevi, we investigate effects of CFPR on the probability of owning any homestead or 
cultivable land. We use tin (corrugated iron sheet) for roof material as a proxy to gauge the 
quality of living conditions.  
Occupational choices are important targets of the CFPR program. The explicit intention is that 
the program engenders self-reliance in terms of the participants’ occupational choices and at 
the same time, a move away from crisis or dead-end occupations such as day laboring, working 
as household maids or begging. Information on employment activities and income earned (also 
the value of income in-kind) was obtained from all members of the household with respect to 
the year preceding the survey. The amounts were aggregated to arrive at the total household 
income. Avenues that yielded the highest remuneration over the preceding year were 
designated as the main source of income in this study. Self-employment in either the 
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agricultural or non-agricultural sector was grouped together and labeled as entrepreneurs.vii 
Those begging or working as maid in other households were grouped together as they 
predominantly represented female headed households and sample sizes by themselves limit 
separate analysis. As day laborers represent a substantial proportion of the sample, they were 
designated a stand-alone category while an ‘other’ category consisted of miscellaneous forms 
of employment. 
Socioeconomic hierarchy plays a significant role in everyday life for the members of these 
communities. As a proxy for social capital, information was collected on whether the members 
of the households had been invited to others’ homes or at social gatherings.   
As for food security, the questionnaire asked if the households were able to manage at least 
two full meals daily. Financial market participation is measured by whether or not households 
have formal loans, typically from microfinance institutions, or informal loans, from money 
lenders or loan sharks, generally at high interest rates.  
All models control for baseline household information on demographics, socioeconomic status 
and regional characteristics. Furthermore we include indicators that reflect whether or not 
households meet the CFPR selection criteria. The exact definition of all outcome and control 
variables is provided in Tables 1 and 2.  
3.2 Analytical techniques 
The effect of CFPR participation is identified by comparing the trend in outcomes of those 
households identified as poor but not selected into the program with those that were selected 
into the program. While according to the program description, households selected for the 
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CFPR need to meet 3 of the 5 inclusion criteria and all exclusion criteria, we find limited 
differences in the distribution of these characteristics across the treated and control groups 
(see Annex Figure A1).  This suggests that the in- and exclusion criteria are not implemented 
very strictly and precludes the application of a regression discontinuity analysis. Although three 
quarters of the participants fall within the poorest quartile, Emran, Robano, and Smith (2009) 
also confirm there are a considerable number of households who met all the selection criteria 
but were excluded from the program and vice versa (Sulaiman and Matin, 2006).viii 
We estimate effects of CFPR using difference-in-differences (DiD) regression with weights 
obtained from propensity score matching (Ho, Imai, et al., 2007; Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009). Combining regression and propensity score weighting has the advantage of only 
requiring one of the two approaches, the specification of the propensity score or the regression 
model, to be correctly specified – the “double robustness” property. We first estimate 
propensity scores (𝑝(𝑋0; 𝛾)) from a probit model of the treatment indicator on the baseline 
values (𝑋0) of all outcome variables presented in Tables 1 and 2 (see Annex Table A1 for the 
results of the probit model). Figure 1 illustrates the overlap in the distribution of the propensity 
scores across treated and control groups, with 1120 households not being on the common 
support. In a second step, we use linear regression where we weigh the objective function by 
the inverse probability of treatment or non-treatment. More specifically, we construct weights 
equal to 1 for treated observations and 𝑝(𝑋0; 𝛾)/(1 − 𝑝(𝑋0; 𝛾)) for control observations. The 
regression model we estimate is the following: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖0 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑋0𝛽𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 2005, 2008, 2011 (1) 
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where the subscript 𝑖 refers to households and 𝑡 to the year. 𝑌is the outcome of interest, and 𝐷 
represents the treatment group indicator. 𝑌𝑖0 refers to the outcome in the year we are 
comparing with. In a first step we compare outcomes in 2005, 2008 and 2011 to those in 2002 
to establish effects in respectively the short, medium and long term, and thereafter we 
compare 2008 with 2005 and 2011 with 2008 to quantify the incremental effects.  The average 
treatment effect on the treated is captured by𝛿𝑡. Controlling for baseline characteristics 
𝑋0weakens the identifying assumption to the requirement that, conditional on baseline 
observablesix, outcomes for the treated group would have evolved in the same way as those of 
the controls in the absence of treatment. We cannot formally test for the plausibility of this 
parallel trends assumption, nor do we have pre-treatment trends in outcomes, but the 
substantial overlap in the distribution of the propensity scores does suggest that both groups 
are comparable in observables at baseline. Note that model (1) is only estimated on the sample 
that is on the common support. 
To explore heterogeneity of effects across type of employment and the gender of the 
household head, we estimate the propensity scores and regression models separately for each 
subgroup. 
Robustness of results is confirmed to using non-parametric matching techniques combined with 
DiD (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009). Results are reported in the Annex Table A2. We use a 
Nearest Neighbor (NN) matching (using 5 neighbors) algorithm as this resulted in the largest 
average bias reduction (21.9 percent to 1.1 percent, with the bias no longer significant). Table 3 
illustrates the reduction in bias obtained from the matching for each of the variables included in 
the propensity scores. While we acknowledge that t-tests are heavily dependent on the sample 
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size (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), it is reassuring that differences in observables between 
matched treated and controls are small and in no instance statistically significant. The average 
treatment effect on the treated from the NN matching with DiD is obtained as follows (Blundell 
and Costa-Dias, 2009): 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑀𝐷𝑖𝐷 = ∑ {[𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖0] − ∑ ?̌?𝑖𝑗[𝑌𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑗0𝑗∈𝐶 ]}𝑖∈𝑇 𝑤𝑖     (2) 
where 𝑇 and 𝐶 represent the treated and control group, ?̌?𝑖𝑗is the weight placed on comparison 
observation 𝑗 for the treated observation 𝑖, and 𝑤𝑖accounts for the reweighting that 
reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. 
3.3 Attrition 
As the data covers a time span of 9 years, the rate of attrition is relatively high with 72 percent 
of the households being observed in every wave. Households that drop out of the survey at any 
of the waves are less likely to own physical assets such as livestock or homestead land at 
baseline, but none of the other baseline characteristics were significant predictors of attrition 
later on in the panel (see Annex Table A1). In our models, attrition is only a problem to the 
extent that it correlates with participation in the CFPR program. The rate and pattern of 
attrition across the years were found to be comparable across treated and control group (a 
total of 32 percent and 33 percent respectively across the 9 year period).x To test for attrition 
bias we use the test suggested by Verbeek and Neijman (1992); we add a leading selection 
indicator to the DiD model (1) and do a t-test for the significance of this indicator (Jones, Rice, 
et al., 2013). The null of no effect was rejected only for the models on entrepreneurship (p-
17 
 
value=0.03) and having a tin roof (p-value=0.07), suggesting very limited problems of attrition 
bias.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Summary statistics  
Summary statistics of all control variables across survey waves and across treated and controls 
are presented in Table 1. Focusing on the baseline statistics, we see that working aged women 
(14-55 years) represent about a third of the sample (36 and 31 percent respectively for the 
treated and control groups). Female headed households are more prevalent in the treated 
group (73 percent) as compared to the control group (57 percent). The household size is 
significantly smaller for the treated households throughout the years (3.55 versus 3.80). In 
terms of education, the control group appears to fare better in general. Nearly 92 percent of 
household heads in the treated group have had no education compared to 87 percent in the 
control group at the baseline. Trends in control variables are relatively limited and similar 
across treated and control group, confirming limited problems of selective attrition.  
Summary statistics of outcome variables are presented in Table 2. Results illustrate that the 
treated are significantly worse off than the control at the baseline in terms of livestock 
ownership. By 2011 however, the treated are more likely to have a greater number of 
cows/bulls (0.72 versus 0.42 for the control) and a greater number of poultry (1.95 versus 1.83 
for the control). The treated are also disadvantaged in terms of participation in financial 
markets at baseline. The percentage of households having cash savings is more than double in 
the control group compared to the treated (21 percent versus 9 percent respectively). Only 4 
percent of the treated (versus 32 percent of controls) reported participating in the formal 
financial market such as NGOs while 37 percent (versus 30 percent of treated) reported 
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borrowing money from high interest money lenders in the year preceding the survey. By 2011 
the proportion of formal loans has increased drastically among the treated (up to 53 percent), 
compared to both baseline and the control. 
Similar trends were also seen for the other outcomes. While treated individuals had lower per 
capita income than controls at baseline (BDT 2530 and BDT 2825 respectively), their income 
increased significantly faster over time (BDT 9051 for the treated and BDT 8264 control in 
2011). The treated sample had lower rates of self-employment (20 percent) than controls (31 
percent), and higher rates of unyielding occupations (18 versus 9 percent). By 2011 however, 
the treated have become more likely to be self-employed (to 31 percent) and less likely to be 
working as beggars or maids (to 15 percent), while there have not been much changes 
regarding employment among the controls. The majority of the respondents among both 
groups depended on day laboring as the main source of their income (60 and 54 percent for 
treated and controls respectively), and this proportion fell by 10 percentage points (pp) for the 
treated by 2011. 
Regarding land and asset ownership, the treated were worse off at baseline with only 45 
percent of the treated having any homestead land compared to 60 percent of controls. By 
2011, this proportion had gone up by 15pp within the treated sample, while not much 
happened within the control group. The proportion owning any cultivable land was quite low 
for both the treated and control groups at baseline (2 percent and 8 percent respectively), and 
increased only slightly for the treated group by 2011.  Owning houses with roofs made of tin 
was more common within the control group at baseline (10pp difference), but by 2011 the 
large majority of both groups had them (over 90 percent for both groups). 
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Finally, respondents in the treated group had a lower degree of food security at baseline, with 
52 percent being able to manage two meals a day (versus 67 percent of controls). By 2011, the 
treated group had caught up. Similar patterns emerged for the probability of being invited to 
village social events.  
In sum, we see a pattern of the treated group being worse off at baseline but catching up, and 
even overtaking, the controls by 2011. Table 3 shows baseline characteristics across both 
groups within the matched sample (using NN matching), and confirms that no significant 
differences between both groups are left post-matching. 
In the next section, we present which part of the difference in trends between both groups can 
be attributed to participation in the CFPR program. 
4.2 Impact of CFPR participation 
The upper panel of Table 4 shows CFPR impact on primary outcomes primarily affected by 
program participation, as estimated by the weighted regression models. Analysis reveals that, 
net of program transfer, CFPR  had led to an increase in the number of cows or bulls owned by 
1.5 by 2005, but this effect decreased by 0.5 in each of the following waves leaving the overall 
effect over the full period to be only 0.4. Also the number of goats and sheep, increased by 0.39 
by 2005 but this effect somewhat dissipated by 2011. As for the number of poultry, the largest 
effect was observed in 2008 (1.6) and diminishes afterwards. It should be noted that the 
decline in effects on the number of livestock over time is not so much driven by a reduction 
within the treated group, but rather by a catch up among the controls.xi 
21 
 
Regarding financial participation, we find that the program substantially increased the 
probability of having any cash savings (62pp). This effect diminishes somewhat in later years, 
but even when comparing 2011 to 2002, the effect of CFPR remains substantial at 37pp. 
Program participation also increased the probability of borrowing from formal sources (by 
32pp) by  2005 while at the same time reduced the probability of  borrowing from informal 
sources (by 11pp). Mid-term effects are smaller at 23pp and 11pp respectively, and long-term 
effects are further reduced but remain significant, at least for taking up formal loans (13pp). 
Again these diminishing effects appear to be driven by a catch up of the controls rather than a 
decline in the percentage with cash savings, and formal or informal loans among the treated. 
In general, we see quite strong effects on most of the directly incentivized outcomes in the 
short and medium term, and some decline in effects in the long term. This is not necessarily 
undesirable if it reflects households using some of the assets and credit to develop alternative 
activities that also lead to welfare improvements. The following paragraphs discuss effects on 
the secondary outcomes that reflect household socioeconomic and social status (lower panel of 
Table 5). 
At par with the existing evidence, the effects of CFPR on per capita income are very large and 
increasing over the medium term until 2008 (BDT 827, which represents 33% of the baseline 
average in 2005 and an additional effect of BDT 675 by 2008).  We find no significant change in 
the impact between 2011 and 2008, although the sign is negative, which appears related to 
some catch up among the controls in the later period.   
Moving to the effects on the primary source of income, we find the program to increase the 
probability of engaging in entrepreneurship in either the agricultural or non-agricultural sector 
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until 2008 (9pp by 2005 and an additional 7pp by 2008). However, this effect diminishes 
significantly by 12pp by 2011, which renders the long-term effect to be rather limited (4pp).   
Program participation also significantly decreased the probability of households undertaking 
unyielding occupations such as day laboring, working as maids or begging as the main source of 
income until 2008 (8 pp by 2005 and an additional 7pp by 2008), however, the effects also 
taper off by 2011. Given the relatively stable employment patterns that are observed in the 
control group (Table 1), it appears that while the program caused an initial shift to more 
entrepreneurial employment activities, by 2011 many treated households reverted back to 
their baseline occupations.   
CFPR participation increases the probability of owning homestead land by 5pp by 2005 and by 
an additional 4pp by 2008, and the effects stagnate afterwards. Effects on the probability of 
owning cultivable land, which would typically be more expensive, are smaller, with only a 
significant effect of 4pp by 2008 that disappears by 2011. Program participation increased the 
probability of having a tin roof in the short term (7pp), but this effect reduces by half in 2008 
and further by 1pp in 2011, which appears to be driven  by a catch up in the control group as by 
2011 the majority of households in both groups have a tin roof.  While we find very little impact 
on ownership of radios or televisions (2pp in 2008), the effects of program participation on 
food security are quite substantial in the short term. The probability of being able to secure two 
meals a day is increased by 14pp in 2005. By 2008 however, the effect is reduced by 6pp and 
disappears by 2011 as close to 90 percent of households in both the treated and control group 
are able to manage two meals a day by 2011. 
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Finally, participation in the CFPR program increased the probability of being invited to others’ 
houses or social event in the short (9pp) and medium-term (11pp). By 2011, the control group 
is also more socially involved, which causes the CFPR effect to disappear.   
 
4.3 Heterogeneity of impact on income and employment 
Having established average treatment effects on the full sample of treated, we now investigate 
heterogeneity of these effects across baseline employment and across the sex of the head of 
the household. Female headed households, generally more vulnerable and disadvantaged, 
constitute an important group in the CFPR target population and because of their distinct 
socioeconomic and cultural characteristics; it is interesting to investigate whether CFPR 
participation affects them differently as compared to their male counterparts (see Annex Table 
A3 for baseline comparisons). We focus on effects on income and employment, both for 
reasons of parsimony, but also because these could be considered most important reflections 
of (long term) socioeconomic status. 
The first rows of Table 5 and 6 show the heterogeneity of CFPR impact on income by baseline 
employment status and sex of the household head. Results reveal that while short term income 
effects are relatively similar across employment categories (approximately BDT 850 on 
average), they diverge in the following years. Between 2005 and 2008, baseline entrepreneurs 
experience an increment of BDT 727 and day laborers an increase of BDT 626, the increment for 
beggars or maids are no longer significant (and even negative). In the subsequent period 
between 2008 and 2011, only baseline entrepreneurs gain a further BDT 784.  
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Table 6 shows income effects across female and male headed households. It appears that in the 
short term, the income effect for female headed households is more than double that of male 
headed households (BDT 1279 and BDT 525 respectively). Additional gains made in the 
following period (2008 to 2011) are comparable between the female and male headed 
households (BDT 562 and BDT 654 respectively) while neither group experiences further 
significant gains in the long run. This finding somewhat contradicts those from the 
heterogeneity by baseline employment characteristics, which suggested that the program is 
most effective in the long term for those households that could be considered better-off at 
baseline. Next we investigate to what extent the changes in income effects can be related to 
changes in the employment trajectory. 
The bottom four rows of Table 5 show how the employment trajectories caused by the program 
vary across baseline employment categories. For those already engaged in entrepreneurial 
activities at baseline (columns 1-3), we see a pattern in the short term of CFPR sustaining their 
business (as compared to the control group). The treated are 13.1pp more likely to have 
remained entrepreneurs, and less likely to have become day laborers, as compared to the 
control group. Thereafter we see relatively little changes in occupation, except for a 7.4pp 
increase in the probability of having other types of professions (such as those with salaried 
employment, part-time workers, politicians) as compared to the controls between 2008 and 
2011. The stability in entrepreneurial activities and a move to other professions, within this 
subgroup of baseline entrepreneurs does seem to coincide with long lasting income effects as 
was discussed before.  
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Households that were mainly begging or working as maids at baseline (columns 4-6) were 
initially pushed by CFPR towards entrepreneurship (16pp increase) or day laboring (8pp 
increase). This effect of increasing entrepreneurial activities seems to have persisted in 2008, 
with a further move from those that initially had gone into day laboring to starting their own 
business.  However, by 2011 it appears  that of those who were working as maids or begging in 
the baseline and had subsequently switched over to entrepreneurship over the years, nearly all 
had reverted back to their original profession or shifted to day laboring. This pattern could 
explain the absence of income effects after the initial period discussed before. 
We see a similar trend for those households that start off as day laborers, although changes are 
less drastic. CFPR participation causes a 6pp increase in the probability of becoming 
entrepreneurs by 2005,  and this probability further increases by 8pp by 2008, but starts to 
decrease by 2011 (11pp). This decrease appears to be driven by a move back to day laboring, 
and some households even go into begging or working as maids. Again this pattern could be 
related to the pattern in income effects, which had increased over the first two periods but 
started to decrease by 2011 (although not significantly). 
Changes in employment trajectories across the gender of the household head (last four row of 
Table 6) reveal that  program participation caused female headed households to move from 
begging or working as a maid to undertaking entrepreneurship (14pp increase) by 2005. The 
probability of entrepreneurial activities further increased by 9pp between 2005 to 2008  
precipitated by a move away from working as day laborers.  Between years 2008 and 2011 
however, the probability of entrepreneurship dropped again by 13pp while the probability of 
working as maids or begging increased by 6pp, indicating that some of these households 
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reverted back. This is also reflected in the income effects, that become negative (although not 
significantly) by 2011.  
Male headed households participating in CFPR are also initially more likely to move to 
entrepreneurial activities (from day laboring), but effects are smaller than for female headed 
households which could explain the smaller short term income effects for this group. Similar as 
their female counterparts, the trend of increased entrepreneurial activities is sustained in 2008, 
but reverts thereafter. By 2011, most of those households that started a business have moved 
back to day laboring or even begging/working as maid.  
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5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
The program Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR): Targeting Ultra Poor was 
initiated in Bangladesh in 2002 by BRAC, one of the largest non-governmental organizations in 
the world. The CFPR program was implemented with the explicit goal of targeting the ultra-
poor and graduating them to a socioeconomic status where they could avail themselves to 
mainstream poverty alleviation programs such as microfinance. A number of studies have 
confirmed its short (2002-2005) and medium term (2005-2008) positive impacts on income, 
ownership of productive and non-productive assets, food security and health (Ahmed, Rabbani, 
et al., 2009; Ahmed, 2006; Mehnaz and Sulaiman, 2006; Rabbani, Prakash and Sulaiman, 2006; 
Haseen and Sulaiman, 2007; Krishna, Poghosyan, and Das, 2012; Raza, Das, and Misha, 2012). 
This study is the first to use a 4 round panel data over 9 years to identify the effects of the 
program in the long run (2002-2011). Furthermore, this paper investigates heterogeneity of 
program impact across baseline employment characteristics and gender of the household head.  
In line with existing studies, we find that outcomes that are directly affected through different 
program inputs such as the livestock, cash savings and financial market participation are 
positively affected in the short term (Raza, Das, and Misha, 2012). Between medium and long 
term, however, effects often start to slow down. This is driven more by a catch up of the 
control group than by a fallback among participants. Similar trends were observed for some of 
the other outcomes such as income, land and asset holdings, food security and social capital. 
Income effects for example, were very substantial in the short and medium term with CFPR 
leading to income gains of respectively 33 percent (by 2005) and 60percent (by 2008). 
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Thereafter though still significantly higher, income growth among the controls seems to have 
caught up, causing the CFPR effect to appear less striking.  
There are perhaps a couple of reasons for the control group to catch up. Firstly, the catch-up 
may largely be attributable to actions taken by BRAC. Prior to launching of the CFPR, BRAC 
launched a systematic awareness campaign throughout the country that considerably raised 
the public discourse about the plights of the ultra-poor, especially in the monga affected areas 
(BRAC, 2013). These campaigns led to an considerable influx of public and private funding 
geared towards the eradication of ultra-poverty and ultimately led to trebling of public 
spending in social safety nets in the study districts in the 2002-2011 periods. Similarly, the 
number of NGOs catering to the ultra-poor in this district nearly quadrupled (Kandker et al, 
2011; Ahmed et al, 2011), which led to a universal increase in welfare in the region. In 2000, the 
World Food Program had estimated that the rate of extreme-poverty in 20 of the 23 sub-
districts were between35-55 percent, but dropped considerably by 2010(World Food Program, 
2000 and 2014). Secondly, as both treated and control households are located in close 
proximity to one another, there is the possibility of spillover effects of CFPR, especially in the 
long run. Looking at short term spillover effects within the second phase of the CFPR program, 
Raza and Das (2014) find significant increases in livestock rearing as one of the main sources of 
income among control households.xii Qualitative evidence shows that the information provided 
by CFPR on vaccines for livestock, and on proper housing models for animals is easily 
disseminated among neighboring households. This increase in knowledge and understanding 
leads to an overall growth of such industries within the communities (Hossain and Matin, 2007). 
This was also found to be true for social capital as forums such as the Village Poverty Alleviation 
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Committees or GDBC are purposefully formed for this function. GDBCs have been seen to 
visibly reduce discrimination against poorer social classes in almost all villages they operate in 
and ensure increased social status (Rafi et al., 2010). This finding of ‘catching up’ by control 
households due to the program itself (CFPR in our case) is a new dimension in the impact 
assessment of development programs. This demands further analysis and studies. 
The decline in long term CFPR effects on employment status appears not so much driven by 
catch up among the controls due to spillovers. We see a shift from begging, working as maids 
and day laboring to entrepreneurial activities in the short and medium term, but many CFPR 
households revert back to their baseline employment by 2011. To the extent that moving away 
from unyielding occupations was an important aim of CFPR, this finding suggests that its long 
term capacity building may require further thought and consideration. Recent qualitative 
studies provide some insights for this shift. Intergenerational transfer of assets is extremely 
common in Bangladesh. Case studies show that once the children are married, especially sons, 
the parents are likely to transfer most of their assets to them, including homestead land and 
continuing with their initial occupation on the side (Ahmed et al., 2009). Alternatively, as the 
project concluded seven years prior to the last round of the survey, household members who 
had traditionally assisted in maintaining the program assets had moved (marriage, death, 
employment related migration and so forth) and the original receivers may have lost control 
over the assets. In cases where the assets actually remained with them, lack of assistance had 
forced them to get rid of these assets and go back to the de facto occupations (Das et al., 2013, 
Das and Misha, 2010).  
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Results also show that initial income gains are quite similar across different categories of 
baseline employment, but in the long run, CFPR impact on income is greater for those 
households who were entrepreneurs at the onset of the program than for those starting off as 
beggars or day laborers, confirming earlier findings of Emran, Robano, and Smith (2009) of CFPR 
benefitting most of those in the upper income deciles. Furthermore, we also find that those 
working as day laborers in the baseline are more likely to switch over to entrepreneurship and 
remain so in the long run compared to those who worked as maids or begged for a living before 
the program. 
As female headed households are typically amongst the most vulnerable, special attention is 
paid to them during the course of the program. Despite being worse off at the baseline, the 
female headed households appear to substantially outperform their male counterparts, both in 
income and employment effects, over the short term while the income gains are comparable in 
medium and longer terms. This could be due to the fact that with handholding they are more 
likely to move to (and remain engaged in) entrepreneurial activities as compared to their male 
counterparts.  Anecdotal evidence and field based experiences indeed suggest how that for 
these female headed households, participating in programs such as the CFPR is often the only 
opportunity to improve their livelihoods in a meaningful way and thus acts as a strong 
motivation to perform well. Additionally, it has also been seen that women, when in charge of 
allocating productive and financial assets of the family, are more likely to precipitate greater 
positive change (Baden and Milward, 1995).  Depleting long term effects, however, are likely to 
precipitate by the vulnerabilities the female headed household faced in the first place and 
further handholding, beyond the 24 month period, may be in order to push them forward.  
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There are some limitations to this paper. Most importantly, the selection of treated and control 
groups was not done in a randomized way, leaving the possibility for unobservable 
heterogeneity to violate the parallel trends assumption. The substantial overlap in the 
propensity scores and similarity of baseline characteristics across both groups in the matched 
sample does, however, suggest that the matching techniques used can adequately correct for 
baseline differences in observable characteristics. A second limitation, which is almost 
inevitable with data over such a long time period, is the possibility of other events 
disproportionally affecting either the treatment or control group. Findings from the second 
phase of CFPR, which was set up as a randomized control trial (RCT), do confirm the short and 
midterm effects on income and employment, which suggests that our results are not merely an 
artifact of the purposive selection of treated and controls (Bandiera, Burgess et al., 2014).  
In sum, the evidence in this paper presents an interesting picture on the impact of CFPR.  While 
confirming earlier positive findings, we also see that effects tend to decelerate over the long 
term, driven mainly by catch-up among the control households. The success of the program can 
be considered three-fold. Firstly, the program itself was successful in bringing its participants 
out of ultra-poverty and keeping them so nine years after participation.xiii Secondly, through 
spillover effects, CFPR positively affected households in the program’s vicinity. Lastly, 
substantially raising public discourse precipitated greater efforts from both state and non-state 
bodies to join the movement against ultra-poverty. However not without its caveats, CFPR 
effects, especially on employment, are more likely to be maintained in the long term for those 
households that could be assumed to have more intrinsic capabilities (entrepreneurs) or 
motivation (female headed households). This brings into light the conundrum of whether 
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encouraging entrepreneurship as an occupation is suitable for all. Rigorous qualitative 
investigations to identify reasons why many households revert back to their original occupation 
would be crucial for formulating policy advice regarding CFPR. These results raise the question 
of whether one big push can be sufficient to alleviate ultra-poverty across the board, and 
whether more frequent support sustained over a longer time period can have more long-lasting 
impact.
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary statistics of outcome variables 
Variable name Description 
2002 2005 2008 2011 
P-Value 
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
  Directly Affected Outcomes 
Livestock and nursery          
cowbull_a Number of cow/bulls 0.035*** 0.189 1.599*** 0.223 1.288*** 0.443 0.717*** 0.42 0.000 
goatsheep_a Number of goats/sheep 0.098** 0.131 0.513*** 0.158 0.588*** 0.321 0.293 0.28 0.516 
duckhen_a Number of poultry 0.829*** 1.454 2.495 2.564 3.655*** 2.545 1.953 1.826 0.009 
bigtree_a Number of big trees 0.516*** 1.333 0.518*** 0.713 1.774** 2.024 2.009*** 2.688 0.652 
Financial Participation          
csav Has cash savings (1/0) 0.085*** 0.205 0.899*** 0.303 0.912*** 0.38 0.924*** 0.534 0.000 
formalloan Has formal loans from NGOs (1/0) 0.036*** 0.319 0.510*** 0.225 0.553*** 0.375 0.533*** 0.424 0.000 
informalloan Has informal loans from money lenders(1/0) 0.373*** 0.295 0.407** 0.529 0.234*** 0.322 0.267** 0.339 0.000 
    Indirectly Affected Outcomes 
Socioeconomic Status          
percapinc Annual per capita households income (BDT) 2529*** 2825 3701*** 3360 7678*** 5979 9051*** 8264 0.000 
Occupation           
emp_entrepreneur entrepreneur (ag/non-ag) (1/0) 0.197*** 0.319 0.331** 0.312 0.432*** 0.324 0.318 0.328 0.013 
emp_begging_maid begging or working as maids (1/0) 0.177*** 0.092 0.107** 0.09 0.099 0.098 0.148*** 0.091 0.040 
emp_daylabourer employed as day laborer (1/0) 0.591*** 0.537 0.521*** 0.553 0.421*** 0.515 0.490*** 0.541 0.121 
emp_other employed in other categories (1/0) 0.030*** 0.048 0.042 0.039 0.046** 0.060 0.043 0.039 0.245 
Asset holdings           
owl_h Owns any homestead land (1/0) 0.457*** 0.597 0.491*** 0.556 0.644* 0.669 0.608*** 0.651 0.000 
owl_c Owns any cultivable land (1/0) 0.018*** 0.078 0.054*** 0.076 0.084 0.075 0.034*** 0.061 0.517 
rickvan_a Owns any rickshaws or cycle vans (1/0) 0.010*** 0.031 0.065* 0.055 0.088*** 0.063 0.062 0.066 0.375 
rooftin Roof of the house made of tin (1/0) 0.445*** 0.553 0.792*** 0.771 0.924* 0.916 0.934 0.925 0.003 
radiotv_a Owns any radios/TVs (1/0) 0.008*** 0.018 0.027 0.032 0.034* 0.025 0.030** 0.042 0.875 
Food Security           
twicemeal Usually can have at least two meals a day (1/0) 0.516*** 0.686 0.859*** 0.763 0.898*** 0.836 0.885 0.884 0.000 
Social Capital           
invited Invited to non-relatives' homes 0.245*** 0.29 0.374*** 0.333 0.495*** 0.431 0.499 0.52 0.733 
NOTES: *, **, *** REFLECT STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AT THE 1, 5, 10% LEVEL OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TREATED AND CONTROL GROUP IN EACH OF THE SURVEY YEARS.  THE P-
VALUE REFERS TO A TEST OF THE NULL HYPOTHESIS OF NO DIFFERENCE IN TRENDS IN  OUTCOME VARIABLES BETWEEN TREATED AND CONTROLS.  
[N: 5626 OBS IN 2002; 5320 IN 2005; 4831 IN 2008; 4121 IN 2011]
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Table 2: Summary statistics of control variables 
Variable name Description 
2002 2005 2008 2011 
P-Value 
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
Demographics           
fem14to55 proportions of working aged (14-55) women 0.362*** 0.307 0.366*** 0.319 0.356*** 0.326 0.343** 0.323 0.277 
hhsex male head of household (1/0) 0.573*** 0.737 0.560*** 0.731 0.563*** 0.732 0.549*** 0.726 0.615 
hhsize household size 3.55*** 3.802 3.996*** 4.316 4.347*** 4.668 4.114*** 4.441 0.678 
Socioeconomics           
hh_edunone no education of household head (1/0) 0.917*** 0.865 0.859*** 0.788 0.856*** 0.811 0.865*** 0.804 0.329 
hh_eduprim primary education  of household head (1/0) 0.064*** 0.095 0.113*** 0.157 0.105*** 0.137 0.104*** 0.146 0.333 
hh_edumidhigh secondary/higher education  of household head(1/0) 0.019*** 0.04 0.028*** 0.054 0.038** 0.051 0.031*** 0.049 0.830 
Selection Criteria           
less10 households owns less than 10 decimals of land (1/0) 0.952*** 0.864 0.925*** 0.88 0.869 0.859 0.924*** 0.876 0.420 
nogovbenf households receives no government benefits (1/0) 0.816* 0.83 0.875*** 0.92 0.812*** 0.861 0.820*** 0.862 0.048 
pro_asset household owns any income generating assets 0.407*** 0.58 0.929*** 0.679 0.914*** 0.773 0.748*** 0.707 0.133 
Location           
Rangpur household located in Rangpur site (1/0) 0.321 0.311 0.311 0.301 0.319 0.301 0.285 0.267 0.859 
Nilphamari household located in Nilphamari site (1/0) 0.308 0.292 0.32 0.303 0.321 0.302 0.33 0.315 0.610 
Kurigram household located in Kurigram site (1/0) 0.371 0.397 0.369 0.396 0.361 0.398 0.385 0.418 0.743 
NOTES: *, **, *** REFLECT STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AT THE 1, 5, 10% LEVEL OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TREATED AND CONTROL GROUP IN EACH OF THE SURVEY YEARS.  THE P-
VALUE REFERS TO A TEST OF THE NULL HYPOTHESIS OF NO DIFFERENCE IN TRENDS IN COVARIATES BETWEEN TREATED AND CONTROLS.  
[N: 5626 OBS IN 2002; 5320 IN 2005; 4831 IN 2008; 4121 IN 2011] 
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Figure 1: Distribution of propensity score across treated and control group 
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Table 3: Summary statistics across treated and control group and bias reduction 
after matching 
Variable Treated Control Difference Percent Bias 
Reduction in  
Bias (%) 
percapinc 2502 2507 -6 -0.30 97.8 
csav 0.08 0.09 0.00 -1.10 96.7 
forinformaloan 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.20 99.2 
owl_h_c 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.40 98.7 
hvlu 865 884 -19 -0.80 97.3 
entrepreneur 0.18 0.18 0.00 -0.40 98.3 
dayl_beg_maid 0.78 0.78 0.00 0.30 98.9 
cowbull_a 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.30 98.9 
goatsheep_a 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -1.80 72.8 
rickvan_a 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 100.0 
radiotv_a 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.50 94.2 
wcal 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.30 97.4 
duckhen_a 0.86 0.87 -0.01 -0.40 98 
egg 0.43 0.46 -0.03 -1.50 86.4 
metduck 15.88 15.18 0.70 0.10 99.2 
less10 0.95 0.94 0.01 3.50 88.8 
nogovbenf 0.80 0.80 0.01 2.40 33.5 
fem14to55 0.35 0.36 0.00 -0.90 96.2 
hhedusex 0.28 0.30 -0.02 -1.00 95.4 
twicemeal 0.53 0.51 0.02 4.30 87.8 
pro_asset 0.42 0.44 -0.01 -2.90 91.8 
prohvlu 425 440 -16 -0.70 97.7 
rooftin 0.43 0.41 0.02 4.60 79 
rickvan 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -1.00 93.4 
NOTES: RESULTS SHOW MEANS OF AND DIFFERENCES IN BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE 
TREATED AND CONTROLS IN THE MATCHED SAMPLE (USING NEAREST NEIGHBOR MATCHING WITH 5 
NEIGHBORS). THE PERCENT BIAS REFERS TO THE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE OF THE SAMPLE MEANS OF 
THE TREATED AND CONTROL AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE SQUARE ROOT OF THE AVERAGE OF THE 
SAMPLE VARIANCES AMONG THE TREATED AND CONTROL (LEUVEN AND SIANESI, 2003). 
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Table 4: Effects of the CFPR program across different time periods 
Variables 
D1(2005-
2002) 
D2(2008-
2002) 
D3(2011-
2002) 
D4(2008-
2005) 
D5 (2011-
2008) 
 Primary outcomes 
Livestock and 
nursery 
     
cowbull_a 1.466*** 0.936*** 0.392*** -0.529*** -0.537*** 
goatsheep_a 0.387*** 0.289*** 0.023 -0.095** -0.252*** 
duckhen_a 0.453*** 1.630*** 0.389*** 1.187*** -1.214*** 
bigtree_a 0.014 0.289* 0.032 0.285** -0.242 
Financial 
Participation 
     
csav 0.619*** 0.559*** 0.374*** -0.061*** -0.176*** 
formalloan 0.324*** 0.227*** 0.132*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 
informalloan -0.114*** -0.109** -0.083*** -0.013 -0.027 
  Secondary outcomes 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
     
percapinc 826.587*** 1,493.693*** 1,295.178*** 675.893*** -120.614 
Occupation      
emp_entrepreneur 0.077*** 0.155*** 0.039** 0.065*** -0.118*** 
emp_begging_maid -0.054*** -0.064*** -0.024* -0.012 0.046*** 
emp_daylabourer -0.029* -0.084*** -0.028 -0.056***  0.049** 
Asset holdings      
owl_h 0.048*** 0.087*** 0.072*** 0.038** -0.009 
owl_c 0.009 0.040*** -0.002 0.030*** -0.038***  
rickvan_a 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.006 0.004 -0.022** 
rooftin 0.066*** 0.036*** 0.023** -0.031** -0.016 
radiotv_a 0.007 0.019*** 0.003 0.013* -0.013 
Food Security      
twicemeal 0.140*** 0.083*** 0.023* -0.055*** -0.064*** 
Social Capital      
invited 0.085*** 0.110*** 0.007 0.027 -0.099*** 
NOTES: RESULTS OBTAINED BY LINEAR REGRESSION WITH INVERSE PROPENSITY WEIGHING. * P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01. 
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TABLE 5: HETEROGENEITY OF IMPACT BY BASELINE EMPLOYMENT  
  Entrepreneur Begging or working as maids Day labouring 
Sub-groups (defined in 2002) 
D1   
(2005-2002) 
D2 
(2008-2005) 
D3  
(2011-2008) 
D1 
(2005-2002) 
D2  
(2008-2005) 
D3  
(2011-2008) 
D1  
(2005-2002) 
D2  
(2008-2005) 
D3  
(2011-2008) 
Per capita income (N: 1509) 819*** 727** 784** 863*** 598 -811 818*** 626*** -131 
emp_entrepreneur (N: 1282) 0.131*** -0.031 -0.034 0.157*** 0.129** -0.221*** 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.110*** 
emp_begging_maid (N: 1495) 0.007 -0.032* 0.021 -0.222*** -0.024 0.198*** -0.001 0.002 0.026** 
emp_daylabourer (N: 1292) -0.083*** 0.059 -0.062 0.082* -0.127** 0.053 -0.070*** -0.090*** 0.085*** 
emp_other (N: 1514) -0.055* 0.004 0.074** -0.017 0.022 -0.03 0.009 0.01 -0.001 
NOTES: RESULTS OBTAINED BY LINEAR REGRESSION WITH INVERSE PROPENSITY WEIGHING. * P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01.  
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TABLE 6: HETEROGENEITY OF IMPACT BY GENDER OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
  Female headed households Male headed households 
Sub-groups (defined in 
2002) 
D1  
(2005-
2002) 
D2  
(2008-
2005) 
D3  
(2011-
2008) 
D1  
(2005-
2002) 
D2  
(2008-
2005) 
D3  
(2011-
2008) 
Per capita income (N: 
1509) 
1279*** 563** -216 525*** 654*** -10 
emp_entrepreneur (N: 
1282) 
0.138*** 0.088*** -0.131*** 0.057*** 0.058*** -0.098*** 
emp_begging_maid (N: 
1495) 
-0.107*** -0.007 0.061* -0.002 -0.015* 0.041*** 
emp_daylabourer (N: 
1292) 
-0.009 -0.070** 0.014 -0.058*** -0.041** 0.054** 
emp_other (N: 1514) -0.023 -0.01 0.056** 0.003 -0.002 0.002 
NOTES: RESULTS OBTAINED BY LINEAR REGRESSION WITH INVERSE PROPENSITY WEIGHING. * P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01.  
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Annexure 
 
Annex Figure A1: Comparison between the numbers of inclusion and 
exclusion criteria met by the treated and the control 
Note: Inclusion criteria: Household owns less than 10 decimals of land; Main source 
of income is by female member begging or working as domestic help; no active 
male adult (female household head); School going children working for pay; No 
productive or income generating assets.  
Exclusion criteria: No Active female member in the household; Microfinance 
participants; Household members receive government benefits. 
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Annex Table A1: Determinants of attrition 
Variables Marginal Effects Standard Error 
beneficiary 0.035 0.018 
cowbull_a -0.018*** 0.006 
goatsheep_a -0.011* 0.006 
duckhen_a -0.002 0.002 
bigtree_a -0.005 0.004 
csav 0.027 0.018 
formaloan -0.013 0.015 
badloan 0.012 0.013 
percapinc 0.000 0.000 
entrepreneur 0.006 0.033 
emp_begging_maid 0.018 0.038 
emp_daylabourer -0.04 0.032 
owl_h -0.030** 0.013 
owl_c -0.028 0.027 
rickvan_a 0.026 0.023 
rooftin 0.026 0.016 
radiotv_a -0.012 0.036 
twicemeal -0.015 0.017 
egg -0.006 0.007 
invited 0.001 0.013 
NOTES: RESULTS SHOW MARGINAL EFFECTS OF A PROBIT MODEL. 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE EQUALS ONE FOR HOUSEHOLDS THAT 
ARE NOT IN THE  BALANCED PANEL , 0 OTHERWISE. COVARIATES 
REFLECT BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS. * P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** 
P<0.01. 
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Annex Table A2: Effects of the CFPR program across different time periods using 
non-parametric DiD with matching 
Variables D1(2005-2002) D2(2008-2002) D3(2011-2002) D4(2008-2005) D5 (2011-2008) 
 Directly affected outcomes 
Livestock and nursery     
cowbull_a 1.477*** 0.940*** 0.414*** -0.550*** -0.526*** 
goatsheep_a 0.405*** 0.278*** 0.01 -0.115*** -0.247*** 
duckhen_a 0.506*** 1.634*** 0.403*** 1.111*** -1.231*** 
bigtree_a 0.014 0.25 0.097 0.236 -0.216 
Financial Participation     
csav 0.625*** 0.563*** 0.398*** -0.065*** -0.161*** 
formalloan 0.303*** 0.221*** 0.125*** -0.093*** -0.089*** 
informalloan -0.124** -0.104* -0.071*** -0.020*** -0.024** 
  Indirectly affected outcomes 
Socioeconomic Status     
percapinc 826.51*** 1493.63*** 1163.73*** 679.67*** -180.72 
Occupation      
emp_entrepreneur 0.083*** 0.177*** 0.040** 0.098*** -0.137*** 
emp_begging_maid -0.059*** -0.067*** -0.027** -0.009 0.051*** 
emp_daylabourer -0.035** -0.107*** -0.022 -0.073*** 0.074*** 
Asset holdings      
owl_h 0.050*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.034* 0.0003 
owl_c 0.007 0.036*** -0.008 0.033*** -0.039*** 
rickvan_a 0.028*** 0.035*** -0.003 0.007 -0.032* 
rooftin 0.063*** 0.026** 0.019* -0.040*** -0.007 
radiotv_a 0.011* 0.018*** 0.008 0.004 -0.008 
Food Security      
twicemeal 0.137*** 0.071*** 0.002 -0.070*** -0.059*** 
egg 0.365*** 0.326*** 0.1768** -0.038 -0.200*** 
Social Capital      
invited 0.0527** 0.086*** -0.016 -0.033 -0.097*** 
NOTES: * P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01. 
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Annex Table A3: Summary statistics of baseline characteristics across male and 
female headed households  
Variable name Description 
2002 
Difference 
Female Headed 
Male 
Headed 
Socioeconomic Status    
percapinc Annual per capita households income (BDT) 2354 2633 -321*** 
csav Has cash savings (1/0) 0.103 0.164 0.061*** 
Occupation     
emp_service salaried employment (1/0) 0.023 0.023 -0.001 
emp_entrepreneur entrepreneur (ag/non-ag) (1/0) 0.129 0.229 0.100*** 
emp_begging_maid begging or working as maids (1/0) 0.325 0.036 -0.289*** 
emp_daylabourer employed as day laborer (1/0) 0.409 0.647 0.238*** 
emp_other employed in other categories (1/0) 0.048 0.01 -0.038*** 
Asset holdings     
owl_h Owns any homestead land (1/0) 0.421 0.58 0.158*** 
owl_c Owns any cultivable land (1/0) 0.035 0.053 0.018*** 
cowbull_a Number of cow/bulls 0.045 0.143 0.098*** 
goatsheep_a Number of goats/sheep 0.085 0.129 0.044*** 
duckhen_a Number of poultry 0.833 1.287 0.454*** 
bigtree_a Number of big trees 0.534 0.841 0.307** 
rickvan_a Owns any rickshaws or cycle vans (1/0) 0.006 0.028 -0.022*** 
radiotv_a Owns any radios/TVs (1/0) 0.005 0.017 0.012*** 
rooftin Roof of the house made of tin (1/0) 0.531 0.479 -0.052*** 
Financial Participation    
formalloan Has formal loans from NGOs (1/0) 0.029 0.083 0.054*** 
informalloan Has informal loans from money lenders(1/0) 0.361 0.317 -0.044* 
Food Security     
twicemeal Usually can have at least two meals a day (1/0) 0.537 0.631 0.094*** 
egg Number of eggs consumed in the past week 0.44 0.643 0.202*** 
Social Capital     
invited Invited to non-relatives' homes 0.217 0.293 0.076*** 
NOTES: *, **, *** REFER TO SIGNIFICANCE AT THE 1, 5 AND 10% LEVEL OBTAINED FROM T-TESTS.   
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Annex Table A4: Effects of the CFPR program in the Rangpur District 
Variables D1(2005-2002) D2(2008-2002) D3(2011-2002) D4(2008-2005) D5 (2011-2008) 
 Directly affected outcomes 
Livestock and nursery      
cowbull_a 1.309*** 0.920*** 0.413*** -0.383*** -0.492*** 
goatsheep_a 0.434*** 0.427*** 0.177** -0.005 -0.243** 
duckhen_a 0.502** 1.750*** 0.465* 1.260*** -1.100*** 
bigtree_a 0.379** 0.519** 0.077 0.145 -0.395 
Financial Participation      
csav 0.618*** 0.671*** 0.592*** 0.054** -0.060** 
formalloan 0.378*** 0.224*** 0.107*** -0.155*** -0.105*** 
informalloan -0.057 -0.032 -0.034 -0.090 -0.116  
  Indirectly affected outcomes 
Socioeconomic Status      
percapinc 984.634*** 1,717.551*** 1,728.290*** 748.770*** 221.886 
Occupation      
emp_entrepreneur 0.058**  0.134*** 0.085** 0.075** -0.040 
emp_begging_maid -0.054** -0.067*** -0.054* -0.013 0.013 
emp_daylabourer -0.013 -0.076** -0.059 -0.063* 0.013 
Asset holdings      
owl_h 0.127*** 0.152*** 0.088** 0.024 -0.049 
owl_c 0.020 0.061*** -0.005 0.061*** -0.052*** 
rickvan_a 0.036** 0.060*** 0.008 0.025 -0.035  
rooftin 0.062*** 0.019 0.012 -0.045** -0.001 
radiotv_a 0.009 0.019 -0.013 0.01 -0.028* 
Food Security      
twicemeal 0.101*** 0.094*** 0.084*** -0.004 -0.071** 
egg 0.403*** 0.360*** 0.142* -0.044 -0.251** 
Social Capital      
invited 0.107*** 0.142*** -0.01 0.029 -0.132*** 
NOTES: RESULTS OBTAINED BY LINEAR REGRESSION WITH INVERSE PROPENSITY WEIGHING.* P<0.1; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01. 
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Notes 
i Positive short term impact and learnings from the first phase paved the way for CFPR Phase II, 
which was operational from 2007 to 2011 and encapsulated approximately 300,000 households 
across 40 districts. Issues specifically faced during the first phase such as heterogeneity among 
the ultra-poor were incorporated into a diverse intervention package. This paper however deals 
exclusively with the first phase of the program. 
ii These households often reside within other households maintaining a clientelistic relationship 
with the latter, though in all intents are purposes are individual economic entities (Emran, 
Robano, & Smith, 2009). 
iii The inclusion criteria include (3 of 5 have to be met): Household owns less than 10 decimals 
of land; Main source of income is by female member begging or working as domestic help; no 
active male adult (female household head); School-aged children working for pay; No 
productive or income generating assets. The exclusion criteria, of which all have to be met, 
include: No Active female member in the household; Microfinance participants; Household 
members receiving government benefits such as old age pensions. 
ivThe exchange rate in 2002 was USD $1=Bangladesh Taka (BDT) 69.28 while the PPP $1=BDT 
16.25 during the same time (World Bank, 2013). 
v Despite the global economic downturn, Bangladesh received over USD $7 billion during the 
latter half of 2013 as remittances, nearly 13% of the national GDP (World Bank, 2013). 
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viNinety-seven percent of respondents own less than 10 decimals of homestead land while 
more than half reported owning none at the baseline. Ninety-seven percent of the surveyed 
responded negatively to owning any amount of cultivable land. 
vii Entrepreneurial activities also include households that have skilled labor such as carpenters 
and blacksmiths to households that sell milk from livestock or eggs from poultry. 
viiiEmran et al (2014) use these assignment errors as an instrument to identify impact of the 
program. This approach however leads to small samples of treated and controls, and does not 
identify the effect of the program on the full sample of treated. 
ix We prefer controlling for baseline characteristics as opposed to time-varying characteristics 
because with such a comprehensive intervention the latter could be affected by program 
participation.   
x The rate of attrition for the treated and controls were 6.16 and 7.99 percent respectively until 
2005. Between 2005 and 2008, the rates were around 10 percent for both groups, while 
between 2008 and 2011, the attrition was around 15 percent for both groups. The attrition rate 
was the highest during the last interval due to one of the local BRAC branch offices closing 
down, leading to similar declines in the number of observations for both the treated and the 
control groups.  
xi The average number of cows/bulls increased 20 fold during the entire period whereas the 
number of goats/sheep and poultry more than doubled. 
xii In some localities in Kurigram and Nilphamari district, a watered-down version of CFPR has 
been implemented in the 2007-2011 period. This could potentially bias downward our impact 
estimates. We have conducted a separate analysis for the Rangpur district, in which no such 
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programs were implemented before 2011 and confirmed that estimates were qualitatively 
similar to those in the full data, and quantitatively slightly larger (see Annex Table A4).  
xiiiWhile the average per capita income per day among the treated was $0.43, by 2011, it 
increased to $1.53.  
